New Conventions for Old 177Another element of Miller’s case is concerned with the questions: does nationalism
require state sovereignty, and are there any obligations holding between nation states?
Miller takes it for granted that ‘each nation in asserting its claim for self-determination
must respect the equal claims of others who may be affected by its actions’ (Miller
1994: 145). This is essentially the universalist element in particularism. He sug-
gests that complete sovereignty does not follow from nation statehood, trade-offs
are possible. Sovereignty should therefore not become a fetish for nationalists. Yet,
nation states still, for Miller, retain a right to decide what to secede. There may
be good reasons for transferring powers to a confederal body, but the most crucial
elements are still rescindable. Miller is thus not interested in applying (like Charles
Beitz) the Rawlsian difference principle internationally. Yet international justice can,
and frequently does, limit national sovereignty (Miller 1994: 150–2). Miller is per-
fectly content with this. There can be justice across boundaries if nations choose to act
reasonably.
All three central arguments of recent liberal nationalism are unpersuasive. The
complex character of the social or embedded constitution of the individual is assumed
as unproblematic. In fact, the idea of ‘being embedded in conventions’ is far more
complex and variegated than stressed by most nationalist writers. This will be explored
more in the next chapter. Further, the arguments for transferring respect from human
individuals to nations also appear woefully inadequate and unsatisfactory. The ana-
logy of individual respect with respect for nations simply does not work and requires
further explanation. In addition, self-determination is a profoundly difficult and elu-
sive notion, particularly if carried over onto nations and states. It is certainly not
impossible to deploy the term and it may of course be used in a trivial sense by inter-
national relations theories, indicating that states appear to act in a unitary manner—
however, liberal nationalists want the idea to work harder for them. This ‘harder’
application is unconvincing. Further, self-determination, by individuals or states,
does not lead to or guarantee any particular institutional arrangements. Autocracy or
liberalism is an equally possible outcome.
Neo-Aristotelianism
Unlike nationalism (and aspects of communitarian theory), neo-Aristotelianism has
remained a largely academic political theory debate. However, like these other conven-
tionalist doctrines, it shares disquiet with the thin universalism of some liberal justice
theories.^8 Equally, although critical, again, it does not seek to overcome the idea of
foundationalism. It rather identifies the problem of foundationalism as something
that can only be systematically addressed through a qualified form of conventional-
ism. Thus, like nationalism and communitarianism, it is concerned to ‘shore up’ the
foundations of theory from a qualified conventionalist perspective. There are though
variations on a theme here.
Comparative to communitarianism and nationalism, neo-Aristotelianism is more
of a minority taste, which only developed in the last two decades of the twentieth