An Eclectic Subject 13out of its way to develop a new universal but immanent foundationalism, even if in
some cases it was a very thin or bleached version. The whole of early justice-based
theory was consequently seen, by some, as a resurgence of classical normative theory
or ‘grand theory’.
Part Three deals with, first, the initial critique of Rawls and justice-based theory.
This movement was not so much a resistance to the idea of foundationalism as to its
universalist pretensions. However, since the immanent foundational claims in early
Rawlsian and related theories were so closely linked to the universalist aspiration, the
critical resistance to Rawls et al. looked as if it was opposing all forms of foundational
argument. However, what was really taking place was, on the one hand, a qualified
rejection of universalism and, on the other hand, an attempt to find a much more
secure, realistic, and sociologically or historically meaningful foundation. In effect,
this was a response to what was perceived to be the immanent danger of thelossof
foundations present within the overly optimistic arguments of early justice theories
in the 1970s. The critical response to justice theory, in my terminology, was the
attempt to root political theory in a form of conventionalism. This was, therefore,
an effort to ‘shore up’ the more comprehensive foundations of political theory by
locating them in communal or social conventions. The concept of ‘convention’ is
used here, therefore, as a linking device to establish coherence between a number
of quite disparate theories. Convention roughly denotes a continuous, established,
social, or historical practice or rule. This is one of the richest and most complex
developments in political theory, which has preoccupied a great deal of the discipline
through the last two decades of the twentieth century. Part Three is divided into two
chapters. The first, ‘Shoring Up Foundations’, examines the sophisticated origins of
a conventionalist argument in the writings of Michael Oakeshott, the better known
writings of communitarianism and the reactions of the later Rawls, in terms of his
ideas on political liberalism. The second, ‘New Conventions for Old’, analyses the
conventionalist writings of nationalism, neo-Aristotelianism, and republicanism.
Part Four has two chapters. Overall, it deals with the potential implosion of founda-
tional argument implicit within conventionalist logic. The first chapter, entitled
‘Segmented Foundations’, examines the processes of internal fragmentation implicit
within the logic of the conventionalist arguments, using the generic conceptual theme
ofpluralismto analyse liberal pluralism, multicultural pluralism, and difference-based
pluralism. The basic argument made in this chapter is that conventionalism does not
cease to work at the level of the nation, ethnos, or community. Every traditional com-
munity, nation or ethnos is constituted by multiple sub-communities, sub-ethnie,
and sub-cultures. Thus, the argument about conventions and meanings is pushed
several steps backwards and the foundational claims consequently segment further.
The second chapter is entitled ‘Standing Problems’. The core argument in this chapter
is that conventionalist argument, if pursued, is still profoundly reductionist, although
there are several moredegreesof reductionism. In this sense, radical conventionalism
can mutate into the thesis of perspectivism, and consequently Friedrich Nietzsche
becomes the central figure. In this scenario, conventionalism therefore links up with
the intellectual movements of postmodernism and poststructuralism. However, there