Dialogic Foundations 289implicitly present here. Valid norms are collectively achieved and embody a common
good. For Habermas, such basic ethical structures can be given a rational justification.
In essence, Habermas builds and justifies an ethics by examining and bringing to light
the norms which are implicit in all ideal communicative situations. Such norms, for
Habermas, embody both equality, universality, and impartiality. Norms cannot be
valid except when they are rationally agreed to byallparticipants in discourse. The
validity of norms is not premised solely on social conventions, but, conversely, on
whether they could be justified in practical discourse. This is the central ‘trick’ of the
Habermasian scheme. Valid norms arenotdetermined by conventions, but, at the
same time, they are claimed to be the essential componentofordinary conventions.
This combines both Kant and Hegel.
Habermas wants to make clear here the point that norms are derived from
examining what is implicit in intersubjective dialogue. However, any discussion and
evaluation of these norms wouldalsohave to proceed within the terms of rational
intersubjective dialogue, or, an open process of discussion. It could not be derived
from the monologic reflections of an isolated or solitary human subject. Real dialogue
must, in turn, logically presuppose the validity of those very norms, which are them-
selves under discussion. In other words, as soon as one enters upon any attempt to
openly and rationally communicate, or engage in rational dialogue, one immediately
presupposes, invokes and confirms the ‘ethics of discourse’ or ‘valid ethical norms’,
which are implicit in dialogue. To try to communicate openly is to immediately
confirm the point. In other words, ethics is implicit in terms of the transcendental
conditions for any attempt at rational communication.
The above theory also accounts for Habermas’ distinctive theory of democracy.
Within recent political theory three basic models of democracy stand out: liberal,
republican, and deliberative. The liberal model envisages government as an appar-
atus of public administration and society as a series of market-orientated contractual
interactions among private persons or interest groups. Liberal democratic politics is
seen to aggregate private preferences. Democracy then transmits the atomistic prefer-
ences of civil society to the political apparatus. Individuals, in the liberal model, never
leave the domain of their private interests. Democracy is an instrumental process of
expressing preferences and registering them through a vote. The goal is to decide
what leaders or policies will best serve the greatest aggregate of individuals. Com-
munitarians and republican theories are antagonistic to this model. One reason for
the upsurge of the communitarian movement in the 1980s was in fact a rejection of
the individualistic, aggregative conception of social life, implicit within this liberal
conception.
Under the civic republican view, individuals consociate under law. Politics is the
articulation of the common good of all citizens. Republicanism thus embodies a
more substantive consensual ethical vision of the good life. Democracy is not the
mere coordination of interests within civil society. It is rather concerned with dir-
ectly promoting a solidarity, integration, and common good amongst its citizens.
Democratic rights embody the right to participate, to perform duties and deliber-
ate over public issues. The republican trust in public discussion stands in marked