Circular Foundations 301a prejudice, though, is, at the same time, a form of self-transformation, which implies
a ‘dialectical’ growth in the person. Gadamer uses the termBildungto describe this
growth (see Gadamer 1979: 10ff, Grondin 1991: 109).^10 At the same time as being
a self-transformation, it is also envisaged by Gadamer as a quite definite form of
human emancipation.
Thus, those who say that we are constrained by our historical condition and pre-
judices into a hazardous linguistic relativism do not really grasp Gadamer’s point.
He comments, ‘there is absolutely no captivity within language—not even within
our native language’. The reason for this is that any language ‘in which we live is
infinite..., and it is completely mistaken to infer that reason is fragmented because
there are various languages...Precisely through our finitude, the particularity of
our being, which is evident even in the variety of languages, the infinite dialogue is
opened in the direction of the truth that we are’ (Gadamer 1977: 16).
In summary, Gadamer focuses our attention on the relation between every act of
knowing or theorizing and its historical situation. Further, all knowing is linguistic.
Language is not, though, just an instrument or tool, it is our actual being in the
world. It is therefore ontological. We understand ourselves and others in and through
language. Language and understanding are rooted in prejudice and tradition. We
always think and act within a traditional horizon. When dealing with human knowing
we cannot coldly or impersonally consider ourselves as epistemologists, dealing at a
distance with various knowledge claims. Conversely, we are examining, first, the
way humans actually exist in the world. Second, we are evaluating and reflecting on
themthroughour own prejudices. There is no prejudice-free thought. Hermeneutics
facilitates us in bringing these prejudices to the foreground. This thinking within
prejudice is not though a negative limit. For Gadamer, importantly, it is the productive
basis of all human understanding. There are indeed many ways of interpreting our
prejudices. We are formed by historical prejudices in an infinity of ways—all of which
are potentially open to examination. This is not, for Gadamer, a theory, but the
human condition.
Enlightenment and Positivism
The concept of prejudice is also useful for unpacking Gadamer’s view of Enlight-
enment reason, positivism, and natural science. He shares with Habermas a deep
unease that these latter views have begun to dominate the way in which we think in
all spheres. One way to introduce this discussion is to invoke a standard criticism of
Gadamer: how could one distinguish between true and false or right or wrong pre-
judices? For Gadamer, there are a strong vestiges of positivism in this question. The
assumption behind the criticism is that there is a vital distinction to be made between
reason (as the Enlightenment developed it) and prejudice (which opposes reason).
Reason is therefore seen as open, self-critical, and universal and is the very oppos-
ite of prejudice. It is this ‘distancing’ impartiality of reason (drawing our attention
away from our unreasoned beliefs, customs, mores, prejudices, and the like), which