Circular Foundations 313own notion of communicative reason. Sometimes they appear to be very similar,
or, ideally, using the same basic notion of reason, at other times Habermas seems
keen to stress their difference. A broader, but related question, is what is the precise
relation between these knowledge spheres delineated by Habermas inKnowledge and
Human Interest? In separating out spheres in this manner, it allows one to integrate
and broaden the range of knowledge, but, at the same time it does not solve issues
of tensions between spheres, between for example, truth and method; it rather post-
pones debate about such issues. For Gadamer, Habermas has, in fact, solved nothing
with his comprehensive theory of knowledge spheres, except that he has succumbed,
almost unwittingly, to the worst of the Enlightenment utopian illusions—the idea
of a comprehensive overarching critical social science of humanity. For Gadamer,
however, reason, although ‘potentially’ emancipatory, cannot be a separated out as
an objective cognitive concern. Reason is always intrinsic and situated in hermen-
eutic understanding. Basically, therefore, Habermas wants to stress, on one count,
the hermeneutic linguistic or dialogic circle, and, then, he wants, at the same time,
to be able to remove himself (and empirical–analytic method) at will. This latter
utopian ‘opt-out’ allows him to engage in a ‘critique of ideology’ and show the power
and domination present in language. For Gadamer, Habermas’ ‘opt-out’ is a sleight
of hand.
Gadamer’s response also addresses Habermas’s second criticism. The idea that
reason can, at will, just step outside tradition and become somehow a completely
pristine self-critical mode of abstract reflection is just rather silly. Reasonisapreju-
dice and, in Habermas, part of an obvious occidental linguistic tradition, thus, to state
that reason can step outside all tradition is, by definition, just another language-based
prejudice. For Gadamer, to be outside prejudice and tradition is to be outside language
and human understanding. The hermeneutical fact is ‘that the world is the medium
of human understanding’, however, this by no means entails that ‘cultural tradition
should be absolutized and fixed’ (Gadamer 1977: 31). Hermeneutical reflection is
not premised upon a perfect ideal of dialogue. The idea that ideology critique can
reveal something extra, or more fundamental, here about language is deeply prob-
lematic. Gadamer suggests that the question we must ask ourselves here is ‘whether
such a conception does justice to the actual reach of hermeneutical reflection: does
hermeneutics really take its bearing from a limiting concept of perfect interaction
between understood motives and consciously performed action’. In Gadamer’s estim-
ation, however, ‘the hermeneutical problem is universal and basic for all interhuman
experience, both of history and of the present moment, precisely because meaning
can be experienced even where it is not actually intended’. Consequently, he contin-
ues, ‘The universality of the hermeneutical dimension is narrowed down...when
one area of understood meaning (for instance, the “cultural tradition”) is held in sep-
aration from the other recognizable determinants of social reality that are undertaken
as the “real” factors’ (Gadamer 1977: 30–1). Habermas clearly does think that certain
concrete issues—work, labour, and human domination—need to be studied empir-
ically. However, as Gadamer asks, ‘Who says that these concrete factors are outside
the realm of hermeneutics? From the hermeneutical standpoint, rightly understood,