Circular Foundations 315logically performative contradiction of those who reasonably, but sceptically, attack
universal reason. Although initially successful in countering the sceptic, such an argu-
ment is clearly not tough enough to make the stronger case for reason (qua the ideal
speech situation) as transcending differences, prejudices, and traditions. Habermas
also tries to utilize some empirical, psychological, and evolutionary theories to make
his case about a more universal abstracted reason. However, the evolutionary and
psychological arguments areverythinly sketched and provide little really concrete
evidence for his over-ambitious claims. Further, it is not at all clear how Habermas
conceives of the relation between the knowledge sphere embodying ‘evolutionary
determinism’, and the ‘free use’ of practical reason within other knowledge spheres.
This remains a continuing problem in his whole philosophy. Further, any attempt
he does make to rationally construct an evolutionary or psychological development
presupposes that we accept this contestable body of assumptions (horizons), con-
cerning evolution or psychology. In other words, Habermas, unwittingly, reinvokes
the hermeneutic circle again.
Habermas’s response to Gadamer raises certain fundamental issues. He sees
Gadamer’s use of the ontology and historicity of language (which is correct to a
degree for certain facets of human knowledge) as avoiding the issue of the conditions
in which language is constituted. Thus, Gadamer ‘does not see that in the process of
tradition he must consider as already mediated what in terms of its ontological dif-
ference is not capable of mediation: linguistic structures and the empirical condition
under which they change historically’. Gadamer’s argument abstracts certain proper-
ties from language and gives them an empirical externalized imprimatur. Habermas
continues that ‘only because of this can Gadamer also conceal from himself the fact
that the practical connection between understanding and the initial hermeneutic situ-
ation of the interpreter requires a hypothetical anticipation of a philosophy of history
with practical intent’ (Habermas 1996: 174–5). For Gadamer, though, Habermas’
argument reinvokes, once again, the idea of separate knowledge spheres, some of
which can be abstracted from the hermeneutic circle. It thus avoids (by metaphys-
ical stipulation rather than argument) the fundamental ontology of language and the
hermeneutic circle.
Conclusion
Inmanyways, GadamerandHabermas, althoughrejectingolderformsoffoundation-
alism, both still mediate between radical conventionalism and an overt universalism.
Both are acutely focused on intersubjectivity and language as themodus operandi
for any future ethical or political theory. Nonetheless, they represent very different
approaches to human dialogue. They also embody different response to hermeneutics.
In Habermas, it is a hermeneutics of radical suspicion (resonant of some more tradi-
tional critical theory), which demands that language and practice need a much more
thorough-going analysis, from the standpoint of much broader or more compre-
hensive grasp of human knowledge. For Habermas, it is the empirical, psychological,