Conclusion
The central theme of this book has been an examination of the nature of political
theory. This nature has been viewed as intrinsically polyvocal. In order to find a
way through this diversity of approaches, the concept of foundationalism has been
employed to bring coherence and clarity to an internally complex practice. The book
consequently has focused on the various foundations, both repudiated and sought
for, by the diverse schools of political theory. Political theory has been understood, in
this text, as a specializedself-conscious disciplinary practice (or set of practices), which
is largely the product of a twentieth century academicized profession.
During the twentieth century, the idea of foundations has been subject to a
chequered and intricate usage. First, foundationalism can imply an overarching
comprehensive view, often involving a perfectionist strategy and a concept of tran-
scendence. As suggested, this use of foundationalism was an important feature of
political theory in the early 1900s, up to the 1930s. Foundational metaphysical argu-
ments were openly discussed and assessed as part of the subject matter of political
theory. In many of these earlier political theory arguments, the relations between the
individual and the state or human nature and politics, were therefore quite stand-
ardly assessed in terms of rich foundational metaphysical claims. Thus, books with
titles such as the philosophical or metaphysical theory of the state figured promin-
ently in political theory discussion (see Bosanquet 1899; Hobhouse 1918). There was,
in other words, an open acceptance of the importance of foundations (first prin-
ciples or metaphysics). However, this comprehensive foundationalism was reacted to,
with deep negativity and an excoriating scepticism in the 1930s and 1940s, within a
variety of movements, such as empirical political theory, pragmatism, logical posit-
ivist thought, and various forms of linguistic philosophy. There was also an explicit
and vigorous denial that it was the task of political philosophers to discover such
comprehensive foundational principles.
This essentially negative moment constituted the second foundationalist phase.
Much mainstream political philosophy, in this phase, looked like a descriptive, usually
linguistic, phenomenology of social life. The traces of this approach are still present
today. Foundational beliefs were (as I suggested) not abandoned in this second phase.
They were rather replaced by different sets of—often partly hidden—foundational
beliefs or presuppositions concerning the nature of empirical knowledge. This was
not usually something that they wished to be discussed too openly.
Third, in the late 1970s, foundationalism was prosecuted more openly again, but
this time in a moreimmanentmanner. Avoiding open avowals concerning human