The Nature of Political Theory

Conclusion 325

century. The standard criticism is that foundational concerns foreclose, falsify or
constrain discourse, language, or reason. They also invoke a knowledge beyond
experience and focus on overly-monistic answers to the problems of morality and
politics.
However, there is no need for systematic foundationalist study to be conceived in
this manner. The study of foundations, in the context of the hermeneutic circle, is
both an exercise in political and moral theorizing. Such a study entails a recognition
of our finiteness and our inability to attain objective knowledge. As C. S. Peirce
reminds us, we can never attain ‘absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, [or] absolute
universality’ (Peirce 1940: 54–6). This loss of certainty, however, does not, in itself,
undermine the examination of foundationalism,per se. It may, however, conflict with
oneperception of foundationalism, namely one which demands singular, objective,
comprehensive, and universal answers to political or moral questions. The ‘loss of
exactitude’ can be interpreted positively therefore as a call for a political philosophy
which has given up monomyths—whether they are about discourse, gender, rights,
utility, or rationality. This entails a focus on foundations which are considered more
ordinary and multiversal, rather than extraordinary and universal. Such foundational
issues are fundamentally important to us, on an ordinary and everyday basis. We
cannot help thinking foundationally. But, such issues—as the nature of politics or
morality—even though deeply important are never fully resolvable. This is because
foundational arguments are intrinsically unresolvable. Yet, the impulse to keep asking
foundational questions still reoccurs. As Peirce put it, ‘our knowledge is never absolute
but always swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy’
(Peirce 1940: 356). Another way of stating this point is, that it is in the nature
of foundational problems to be both ordinary and to be unfinished. To have multiple
foundational problems and answers, which are not finished, is deeply irritating for
some, but is quite normal and ordinary for humanity, and should become normal
and ordinary within political theory.
In this sense, the question concerning the nature of political theory inevitably
has a number of possible foundational answers. These can be studied systematically.
Foundational non-agreement is though inevitable and possibly valuable, as long as we
think and let others think. We may not be able to identify absolutes, but neither can
we avoid foundationalism. This non-absolute conception of humanity is therefore
involved with a defence of the multiple ordinary ways in which we account for our
political and moral existence. Perfectionist foundationalism or absolute claims for
one particular comprehensive foundation distort the ordinary. Human freedom, in
this sense, is dependent on a separation of foundational powers. This argument
therefore uses multiple foundational argumentsagainstany absolute expectations in
political theory.
In sum, my argument in this book is that it is the nature of human beings to try to
understand. The understanding we seekisthe nature of our being. In political theory
wetrytounderstandthenatureofourpoliticalbeing. Wedothiswiththefoundational
symbols to hand. Foundational questions, although continuously asked, are never
resolved. Yet, we still feel compelled to ask them. A concern with these multiple