We Have a Firm Foundation 35normative theory reading, the ‘is’ of the state could not be separated from the ‘ought’.
The normative was integral to the descriptive. However, increasingly, in the decades
after the 1920s, a second tendency developed, namely, the empirical and normat-
ive were separated out. There was an intrinsic tendency for the historical arguments
and comparative method to be relatively self-sufficient, even during the nineteenth
century. This was already present within the framework ofStaatslehre. The study
of public law, and the description of institutions, were also separate strands within
Staatslehre. Important dimensions of the discipline were therefore alreadyimplicitly
recognized as empirical and descriptive forms of study. In addition, from the early
1900s, the stress on positivistic or empiricist forms of study (over the normative) was
becoming much more commonplace in disciplines, such as political economy and
sociology. This inevitably impacted on the study of politics. This led, in turn, to a
widening gulf between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ of the state. Further, there was a rush of
studies in the early twentieth century, associated with writers such as Graham Wallas,
George Sorel, and Gustav le Bon, amongst many others, which began to undermine
any sense of the normative rationality of the state or citizens. In this context, an empir-
ical method such as social psychology would provide greater insight into politics.^12
We can therefore observe a subtle mitosis within institutionalStaatslehre. On the
one hand, the ‘ought’ dimension of the state withered. The normative treatment of
the state, namely, the ‘philosophical theories of the state’, fell seriously out of favour
by the 1920s, and remained so until the 1980s. This demise was also partly reinforced
by philosophical currents in this same mid-century period, which will be examined
in Part Two. On the other hand, one crucial reason for this demise was due to the
rise of empiricism in the social sciences and philosophy. It was felt within political
science that anything that could be said meaningfully about the state could be said
more adequately by empirical studies. In this reading, all classical political theory
had to offer was the vague possibility of some testable hypotheses. Admittedly, this
tendency to dismiss normative political theory—as embodied in the state idea—was
more acceptable in the United States than in Europe.^13
As a consequence of the withering of the normative component, the ‘empir-
ical’ dimension of state theory expanded massively and diversified into a range of
empirically-orientated studies, with little or no consciousness of their origins. This
empirical dimension constituted the underlying substance to comparative politics,
comparative constitutional studies, political sociology, political anthropology and,
from the 1920s, the new discipline of international relations (see Boucher in Vincent
(ed.) 1997c). It also constituted the underlying genealogy of public administration
and public policy studies. By the 1950s and 1960s, for example, the ‘historical com-
parative method’ ofStaatslehrehad mutated into the comparative politics. Some
older classical normative political theory components were still present, but in a
semi-dormant form. Thus, most of the reputable comparative politics texts, well into
the 1970s, still felt the need to make earnest and respectful nods in the direction of
honorary comparative politics forbears, such as Aristotle or Montesquieu. Yet, more
recently again, comparative politics itself has also fallen on harder times within polit-
ical studies, mainly, one suspects, because it carries the dormant virus of state theory.