54 The Nature of Political Theory
suffered from the increasing emphasis on the segmentation of disciplinary areas in
the early twentieth century. In general, therefore, despite Ernest Barker’s nostalgic
appeal, this more inclusive notion of political science, quaStaatslehre—as closely
linked to classical political theory—was fading fast.
The third use of political science developed from the 1920s. It is here that we
find the groundwork for both the apparent separation of political theory and polit-
ical science and subsequent attempts at the reabsorption of political theoryintothe
imperium of empirical theory. This third use also forms the backdrop in the 1950s to
the sense of spiritual crisis in political theory that pervaded the writings of Strauss,
Arendt, and Voegelin.^36 This third conception was an open attempt, in tandem with
other social sciences such as sociology and anthropology, to emulate the methods
and achievements of the natural sciences. It not only separated out normative and
historical political theory from political science, but also led, in some cases, to the
attempt to colonize the whole concept of political theory. For some, therefore, polit-
ical theorybecamepolitical science. This latter notion still pervades some American
conceptions of political theory, particularly in its rational choice mode—often now
called ‘positive political theory’.
This third sense of political science became, for a time during the twentieth cen-
tury, the dominant use. During the late 1920s a loose sense of identity began to
develop in the social sciences in America.^37 This third sense developed in North
America in two stages.^38 The first stage, from the 1920s up to 1940s, has been seen
as a prelude to behaviouralism. Largely under the leadership of Charles Merriam
in Chicago University, the politics-profession in North America began to turn its
attention away from institutional and historical study towards more empirical and
quantitative techniques.^39 Large political science conferences were held in Chicago
between 1923 and 1925 devoted to the new empirical ‘science of politics’, which,
in the words of one commentator, converted ‘virtually every leader of the profes-
sion to the behavioural persuasion’ (Jensen in Lipset (ed.) 1969: 5). Chicago, under
Merriam, subsequently became a centre of this new scientific approach to polit-
ics. Under Merriam’s academic leadership graduate students such as Leonard White,
V. O. Key, Gabriel Almond, Harold Lasswell, Herbert Simon, and David Truman,
amongst many others, devoted their talents to this new empirical discipline. This
earlier period was, on one level, reacting to the legalism, institutionalism, and com-
parativism of the earlier phase. However, an interest also developed in a more strict
approach to informal behaviour, focused on public opinion surveys, voting patterns,
and socialization processes. This still entailed a blend of empirical political science
with continuing concerns about the normative importance of democracy.
The second stage focused on behavioural political science, which had a powerful
impact in the 1950s and 1960s period. This had a far more immediate and longer
term effect in America than in Britain or Europe. Disciplines like politics, soci-
ology, and anthropology, all became enthralled with the prospect of attaining greater
scientific empirical rigour.^40 For proponents of behaviouralism one should distin-
guishbehaviourismandbehaviouralism. Both shared the belief that the approach
of the natural sciences was most fitting for the study of humans. However, for