We Have a Firm Foundation 61For many exponents of empirical political theory, there are deep problems with
such a view. For example, how could one gain any reliable or testable empirical data
from such elusive ideas? Further, it is not possible to quantify interpretations. If
theory is constitutive in this way, then the whole empirical project looks suspect.
The debate between empirical theory and political theory has not been resolved at
all in political science. There have been some modifications within political science.
There is now an awareness of the bewildering variety of approaches occasioned by
the post-behavioural phase. Thus, some more recent political scientists have tried
to accommodate themselves to what is called ‘methodological pluralism’. For others,
though, this variety generates dismay and anxiety. Felix Oppenheim suggested that
this post-empiricist perspective does inevitably lead to the rejection of the older
forms of positivism and behaviouralism. But, he contends that political scientists
should now avoid both the Scylla of old-fashioned behaviouralism and the Charybdis
of simple-minded relativism. He also notes that ‘to reject...behaviouralism is not to
abandon empiricism’ (Oppenheim 1981: 194). For Oppenheim, constructing good
explicative definitions and explanations in political science still has loose parallels
with good natural science, in demanding accuracy and simplicity. Yet, he admits that
this would not, in political science, produce fully fledged empirical covering laws, in
the older sense of positivism.
One after shock of empiricism, which might be said to be now carrying the torch
of empirical political theory to the present day, is rational choice theory (see Easton
in Farr and Seidelman (eds.) 1993: 302ff.).^49 The origins of rational choice lie within
the discipline of neo-classical economics as well as offshoots of utilitarianism.^50 In
terms of the actual serious development of rational choice, it appeared precisely
at the point of the decline of behavioural theory during the 1950s and 1960s—
although, initially, it was a very marginal and rather occult specialism, out on a
limb as it were from mainstream economics. Despite its economic base, it is still
regarded as somewhat quaint by mainstream economists. The seminal books, which
constitute the cornerstones of the perspective, are Kenneth Arrow’sSocial Choice and
Individual Values(1951), Anthony DownsAn Economic Theory of Democracy(1957),
and Mancur Olson’sThe Logic of Collective Action(1965). Another significant text,
which also had an important impact was James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s
workThe Calculus of Consent(1962), which drew the analogy between voters and
market-based consumers. However, rational choice did not make overtly optimistic
claims for itself until the 1980s. Yet, in the last two decades of the twentieth century
it became, in North America, the fastest growing element of political studies, and
has even been blessed with a distinctive title (to indicate its special status), namely,
‘positive political theory’—which presumably makes the rest of political theory look
a trifle negative.^51 It would now be true to say that in North America it has taken
over the empirical mantle from institutional theory, behaviouralism, and pluralism.
It has also moved confidently into related disciplines, such as International Relations.
As one synoptic study concludes, ‘scarcely an area of political science has remained
untouched by its influence’ (Green and Schapiro 1994: 2). Some keen exponents of
rational choice consequently see this as a great triumph for the perspective (William
Riker 1990: 177–8).