The Dynamics of Religious Economies 103
of all faiths, competition results in eager and efficient suppliers of religion just as it does
among suppliers of secular commodities, and with the same results: far higher levels of
overall “consumption.”
#4: To the degree that religious economies are unregulated and competitive, overall
levels of religious commitment will be high.Conversely, lacking competition, the
dominant firm(s) will be too inefficient to sustain vigorous marketing efforts and the
result will be a low overall level of religious commitment as the average person mini-
mizes and delays payment of religious costs. Notice our theoretical emphasis oncompe-
tition. Religious pluralism (the presence of multiple suppliers) is importantonlyinsofar
as it increases choices and competition, offering consumers a wider range of religious
rewards and forcing suppliers to be more responsive and efficient. A society whose re-
ligious economy consists of a dozen rigid castes, each served by its own independent,
distinctive religious firm, would be highly pluralistic, but utterly lacking in religious
competition. Functionally, the situation of any given individual in such a society would
be identical with the situation of an individual in a society having only one, monopoly
religious firm. And our prediction would be the same: That within each caste there
would be the same low levels of religious commitment as are expected in monopolized
religious economies.
Pluralism and competition usually are linked, but when they are not, it is com-
petition that is the energizing force. Misunderstanding of this point seems to have
arisen because, lacking direct measures of competition, we often have used measures of
pluralism as proxy measures of competition. As noted earlier, however,above a certain
level, pluralism becomes redundant. In principle, maximum diversity is not reached until
everyone in a given population belongs to her or his own individual congregation of
one. Not surprisingly, we have discovered that there is a “ceiling effect” – that beyond
a certain point the market issaturatedand additional pluralism does not increase the
overall level of religious participation.
This theoretical emphasis on competition also suggests thatindividual religious groups
will be more energetic and generate higher levels of commitment to the degree that they have a
marginal market position – lack market share.That is, other things being equal, small reli-
gious minorities will be more vigorous than will firms with a large local following. Thus,
for example, Roman Catholics will be more active, thelessCatholic their community.
Finally, we should acknowledge that sometimesconflict can substitute for competition
as the basis for creating aggressive religious firms able to generate high overall levels of
religious commitment.
#5: Even where competition is limited, religious firms can generate high levels of
commitment to the extent that the firms serve as the primary organizational vehicles
for social conflict.Conversely, if religious firms become significantly less important as
vehicles for social conflict, they will be correspondingly less able to generate commit-
ment. Consider the example of the society noted above in which a dozen rigid castes
each has its own religious firm. Now suppose there is a high level of conflict among
these castes and that the religious firms serve as the organizational basis for these con-
flicts. Perhaps the temples serve as the gathering place for planning all political action,
protest demonstrations begin at the temples, and religious symbols are used to identify
caste solidarity. In these situations, religious commitment would be inseparable from