The Evolution of the Sociology of Religion 65
What then will happen when time-honored forms of society begin to mutate so fast
that traditional patterns of religion inevitably collapse? How will the essential functions
of religion be fulfilled? This was the situation confronting Durkheim in France in the
early part of the twentieth century (Lukes 1973; Pickering 1975). Durkheim responded
as follows: The religious aspects of society should be allowed to evolve alongside every-
thing else, in order that the symbols of solidarity appropriate to the developing social
order (in this case incipient industrial society) may emerge. The theoretical position
follows from this: Religion as such will always be present for it performs a necessary
function. The precise nature of that religion will, however, differ between one society
and another and between different periods of time in order to achieve an appropriate
“fit” between religion and the prevailing social order. The systemic model, so dear to
functionalists, is immediately apparent.
Of the early sociologists, Durkheim was the only one to provide his own definition
of religion. It has two elements:
A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is
to say, things which are set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite
into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.
(Durkheim 1912/1976: 47)First there is the celebrated distinction between the sacred (the set apart) and the pro-
fane (everything else); there is an element of substantive definition at this point. The
sacred, however, possesses afunctionalquality not possessed by the profane; by its very
nature it has the capacity to bind, for it unites the collectivity in a set of beliefs and
practices which are focused on the sacred object. Acting collectively in a moral com-
munity, following Durkheim, is of greater sociological importance than the object of
such actions. The uncompromisingly “social” aspects of Durkheim’s thinking are both
an advantage and disadvantage. The focus is clearly distinguishable from the psycho-
logical (a good thing), but the repeated emphasis on society as a realitysui generis
brings with it the risk of a different sort of reductionism – taken to its logical conclu-
sion religion is nothing more than the symbolic expression of social experience. Such
a conclusion disturbed many of Durkheim’s contemporaries; it is still to some extent
problematic, and for sociologists as well as theologians (but see Bellah, Chapter 3, this
volume).
The evolution of the sociology of religion cannot be understood without extensive
knowledge of the founding fathers and their continuing influence (O’Toole 1984, 2000).
A further point is, however, important. The availability of their writing should not
simply be assumed; it depended (indeed it still depends) amongst other things on
competent and available translations. Willaime (1999), for example, underlines the fact
that the arrival of Weberian thinking in French sociology in the early postwar period
offered significant alternatives to those who were trying to understand the changes
in the religious life of France at this time. Weber’s work (or to be more accurate parts
of his work) became available in English almost a generation earlier (General Economic
History, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism).^2 It follows that a careful mapping
of the dates of translations of key texts between German, French, and English would
(^2) Swatos, Kivisto, and Gustafson (1998) stress an additional point. Quite apart from the ques-
tion of translation, Weber’s acceptance into English-speaking sociology was curiously delayed;
he remained relatively unknown until his discovery by Talcott Parsons. The arrival of large