be inadvertently swallowed. It was partially to avoid the possibility of catching
insects in the folds of one’s garments that the Digambara monks chose to
eschew garments of any kind.
The rationale behind these vows was self-discipline and the burning off of
ajı ̄vas. By non-exploitation of others and the purification of one’s own
lifestyle one was thought able to attain ultimate liberation (kevaljña ̄na).
Obviously, this process could not occur all at once, so some fourteen stages
on the path to liberation were envisioned.
As the Jain community took its place on the subcontinent in subsequent
centuries, the community placed a high degree of emphasis on education –
monks were the teachers and exemplars par excellence. Many lay Jains went
into occupations consistent with their vows – commercial enterprises,
craftsmanship, the study of language and literature, and the production of
the arts especially of miniature portrayals. They were advisers to kings (for
example, of the Kat.amba, Ganga, and Pa ̄n.t.iya dynasties); writers of lexicons
and producers of artistic expressions.
One of the most significant contributions of the Jains to the Indian
landscape was the principle of non-violence itself. Apparently they were
the first people in the world to espouse such an ethic, and its practice was
adapted by Buddhists and selectively appropriated by Jain and Buddhist
dynasties alike. Eventually, it was adapted by vaidikacommunities so that,
by the end of the seventh century CE, foreign travelers from China would
report that vegetarianism was a common practice in India. The ethic has
remained an option in some circles even into the present: Mahatma Gandhi,
for example, was influenced as a young man by Jain neighbors in the state
of Gujarat.
Another important contribution of Jain thought was the role their “logic”
played in maintaining peaceful discourse on the subcontinent. Jains
emphasized the principle of “epistemological relativity” or “many-sidedness”
(aneka ̄ntava ̄da). That is, “truth” had not only two possibilities but several as
expressed in the “doctrine of may be” (sya ̄dva ̄da). According to this logic,
there were several ways of perceiving a thing:
- We may affirm a proposition (sya ̄dasti) – that is, a room may seemwarm.
- We may negate the same proposition (sya ̄nna ̄sti) – for example, a room
may seem cold, especially if we have just stepped from a warmer room. - One may affirm and negate the proposition at the same time
(sya ̄dastina ̄sti) – that is, a room may seem both warm and not warm. - One may say a thing is indescribable (sya ̄davaktavya) – a room may seem
warm/not warm; both/and; neither/nor; that is, the true nature of the
room may be elusive. Some three other more pedantic points follow
from these principles and were developed by later schools.
40 The Early Urban Period