auto-immunity or transcendenceOne could argue that such formulations, especially the reference to the
intimate and yet unpleasant relationship to God, are accidental, that
they take up an old religious language for mere rhetorical or historical
reasons. And, indeed, the statement above comes from an article that
reflects on the role of philosophy. What is the “god within us” but
another formulation for a theoretical activity that takes into account
the whole of our life-world or, as one could say with Husserl, another
word for the operation of the transcendental Ego? This seems to be a
valid objection, but as we will see, there is indeed something in this
“sanctioning of our finitude” that is far more than theoretical activity
or transcendental reflection.
The Patočka of the 1960s, critically distancing himself from Husserl
and paying close attention to Heidegger, understands human existence
as a being-in-the-world that is stamped by finitude and historicity.
But — and this is the decisive difference — his main intention in the end
will not be to retain finitude, but to overcome and transcend it. The
framework here is Patočka’s concept of the movements of human
existence, which can be seen as his most original contribution to
phenomenology. Without going into detail, it is enough to mention
that he distinguishes three basic or fundamental movements of human
life: first, one that is oriented to being accepted, being rooted in the
world; second, one that he calls “self-prolongation,” that is the attempt
to maintain and assert one’s position in the world, this includes work,
fighting, self-assertion; and, finally, the third, and the one that is most
important and also most decisive in our context, Patočka calls the
movement of “transcendence,” of giving oneself away or of devotion
to others. How can this last and somewhat mysterious movement be
explained?
Patočka speaks of the world as having its “trans,” its beyond.^13 But
this beyond, in fact, is a mere negative one, a negative transcendence.
It shows that every movement in the world is just a relative movement.
Patočka also relates this third movement explicitly to Heidegger’s
ontological difference, as the movement that refers to Being instead
of beings and to appearance as such, phenomenality as such instead of
- Patočka, Jan, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, ed. Klaus Nellen, Jiri
Nemec, and Ilja Srubar, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991, 140 (cf. Karfík, 77).