marius timmann mjaalandnot affirm that a particular thing is, i.e., exists, but neither would he
affirm the opposite metaphysical position, that a particular thing is
not. The question of being, even when it comes to particulars, is
therefore answered neither in the positive nor in the negative. Thus,
his radical nominalism consists in questioning the root [radix] of this
distinction. Concerning the question of existence, Derrida is not
willing to speak. He is in fact careful to avoid speaking, as far as
existence concerns. But it is the radical nominalism that enables him
to pose conditional questions in the first place. This ultimate discourse
opens up for the critical enterprise of Derrida. On the same account
this enterprise is worth a renewed critical analysis, exposing the deep
crisis of deconstruction.
Difficulties Defining God
In almost every published volume of Derrida up to 1972 (including
Marges de la philosophie) we find references to and discussions of the
concept and name of God — sometimes in passing, often polemically,
and frequently in order to prepare a critical argument against logocen-
trism and traditional onto-theology. The first kind of argument is
against an ontic understanding of (the being or non-being of) God,^4
the second against a positive infinity defining God in terms of trancen-
dental a priori (or even “pure otherness”),^5 and the third against refer-
ence to God as origin and telos of the History of Being.^6 The polemical
thrust is double-edged; it reveals a consistent case against the reference
to God in philosophical terms as the ultimate justification of Being as
presence, as ousia or parousia, defining the ground and the unity of phi-
losophy.^ This is in line with the philosophical program of writing,
grammatology, and différance, which Derrida launches in the texts in
the 1960s. They do however also betray a deep and persistent concern
with the Name of God; that it might also have another meaning, a
meaning that is not reducible to the three mentioned alternatives.^7
- Cf. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 98 and idem, “Violence and Metaphys-
ics,” in Writing and Difference, London: Routledge, 1978, 142–143. - Cf. Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 114–116; 149-151.
- Cf. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 71.
- Cf. Yvonne Sherwood and Kevin Hart (eds.) Derrida and Religion: Other Testa-