marius timmann mjaalandDerrida’s analysis of the concept of God is, however, alternately very
general, even formalistic, and very intense, exploring the experiences
with and possibilities of an intensive infinity. Methodologically, this
duplicity is of particular interest, and I would actually speak of a
method in this case; a double way (Greek: hodos) of formalization and
deconstruction, in spite of Derrida’s persistent criticism of method in
Husserl, Hegel, and Descartes. Hence the description of a methodical
approach in On the Name:
these two “places,” these two experiences of place, these two ways are
no doubt of an absolute heterogeneity. One place excludes the other,
one (sur)passes the other, one does without the other, one is, absolutely,
without the other. But what still relates them to each other is this
strange preposition, this strange with-without or without-with, without.
The logic of this junction or of this joining (conjunction-disjunction)
permits and forbids at once what could be called exemplarism. Each
thing, each being, you, me, the other, each X, each name, and each name
of God can become the example of other substitutable X’s. A process
of absolute formalization. Tout autre est tout autre.^10Some aspects of the formalization do in fact bring to mind Husserl’s
transcendental reduction. Derrida’s double strategy of describing cer-
tain experiences and formalizing concepts, pursues some phenomeno-
logical concerns also discussed in the Krisis: The formal reduction is
transcendental insofar as it calls attention to the constructive gesture
involved in naming God, including the possibility of naming other-
wise.^11 Derrida’s formal reduction includes a pluralization of possible
meanings, and thus Husserl’s non-ambiguity and universal totality is
replaced by the suggestion of a universal but plural “supposed... .”
When it comes to meaning, however, Derrida underlines that it is nec-
essary to choose the best of these examples, hence the absolute Good,
the agathon, even when it is Good beyond Being, epekeina tes ousias. But
then again, he points out that it is “the best as example: for what it is
and what it is not, for what it is and for what it represents, replaces,
- Ibid., 76. Ibid., 76.
- Cf. Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzen-
dentale Phänomenologie, third edition, Hamburg: Meiner, 1996, 42–44.