Heidegger Aff air to the de Man Aff air 1987–1988 401
matter of courage, but when I think that something needs to be
said or thought, even in a ‘true’ but as yet unacceptable way,
no power in the world can discourage me from saying it. [.. .] I
have sometimes written texts that I knew would cause off ence.
They were, for example, critical of Lévi-Strauss or Lacan – I
knew the milieu well enough, after all, to know that this would
cause a stir – well, it was impossible for me to keep it to myself.
This is a law, it’s like an instinct [or drive (pulsion)] and a law:
I cannot not say it. Between you and me, sometimes when I
was writing this sort of text, a bit provocative and polemical in
some circles, writing something and then, as I was just drifting
off to sleep, half-asleep, there was someone inside me, more
lucid or vigilant than the other, who kept saying: ‘But you’re
completely crazy, you shouldn’t be doing this, you shouldn’t be
writing this. You know perfectly well what’s going to happen.. .’ And then, when I open my eyes and settle down to work, I
do it. I disobey that council of prudence. That’s what I call the
instinct of truth [pulsion de vérité]: it must be said [avoué].^53
The two years of ceaseless combat which Derrida had just experi-
enced did, however, mark a kind of break. The following period
would be characterized by new alliances and by the emergence of an
apparently more mellow Derrida. As if in response to these accusa-
tions, ethical and political questions would soon move to the centre
of the stage.