In Boeotia and a few other areas where federalism had
emerged, there were federal armies with member states con-
tributing troops according to population, and command was
held by federally elected offi cers. Elite units are mentioned at
Th ebes in Boeotia and at Argos in the fi ft h and fourth centu-
ries b.c.e., but we know almost nothing of their organization.
Given that most Greek armies were militias, it is probable
that they were commanded by each city’s magistrates.
Th e Peloponnesian War (431–404 b.c.e.) between Athens
and Sparta and its allies precipitated a number of changes.
For the fi rst time mercenary troops from the poorer regions
of Greece were employed on a large scale as well as special-
ist troops drawn from non-Greek sources. Th e dominance of
the hoplite outside of decisive battles was reduced. Combined
forces of light-armed troops, cavalry, and hoplites were shown
to be eff ective in small-scale actions. Th e length of the war and
the employment of mercenaries led to a growing professional-
ism, visible both at the level of the individual soldier and in
positions of command. Th e greater professionalism and fre-
quent warfare in the fourth century b.c.e. led to the develop-
ment of new tactics and changes in hoplite equipment.
In these years Greek politics had essentially become bi-
polar, with most Greek states aligned with either Sparta or
Athens. In addition to the war’s eff ect on the nature of war-
fare, this confl ict also had profound political consequences. It
destabilized a number of states, leading to internal factional
fi ghting, which was oft en bloody. A number of cities were de-
stroyed and the population enslaved. It led to the Spartans’
realization that the older strategy of laying waste to an oppo-
nent’s agricultural land as the key to victory no longer held
in Athens’s case, since as long as Athens dominated the sea,
it could supply itself from overseas. Th is realization led the
Spartans to solicit Persian money to subsidize their navy and
so involved them in the aff airs of the Greeks of Asia Minor.
By the end of the war Sparta stood supreme. Athens was
subordinated but not destroyed so that it could serve as a coun-
terweight to the ambitions of Th ebes. However, Spartan blun-
ders created a number of coalitions of major Greek states to
oppose Sparta. Sparta’s supremacy lasted until 371 b.c.e. and
Spar ta’s defeat in bat t le by Th ebes, which now assumed Sparta’s
role. By 362 b.c.e. Sparta’s ascendancy had ended, and no state
emerged as dominant; rather, there was a series of combina-
tions in an attempt to limit the power of any one state.THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.E.
Th e rise of Macedonia radically changed the situation. Th e
most crucial development of the fourth century b.c.e. was the
rise of a powerful and expansive monarchy in Macedonia. Its
creation was the work of Philip II (r. 359–336 b.c.e.). Philip
consolidated a weak state rent by faction and in the process
created an army superior to any the Greek world had yet
seen. Macedonia had always had eff ective cavalry, but it was
Philip’s achievement to develop a superb infantry. Its organi-
zation must be inferred from Alexander’s army, whose struc-
ture is far better known. Th e cavalry was organized into eightunits, one being the royal cavalry of 300, which also served
as a bodyguard. Th e other seven units were each 200 to 300
men strong. Th e infantry phalanx was levied by geographical
areas and by the end of Philip’s reign was 24,000 strong and
divided into sections of 1,500. Two other infantry units are
known, one of 250 and one of 16. Th ere were also substan-
tial numbers of light-armed troops of all types drawn from
Macedonian and subject populations, who also provided spe-
cialized units. Th e king was normally in command and had a
number of senior commanders drawn from the Macedonian
nobility, who commanded units on the battlefi eld and in in-
dependent expeditions. Th e Macedonian army represented
a departure from traditional Greek forces. For the fi rst time
a force was created that eff ectively used diff erent modes of
fi ghting in combination in large-scale battle.
Th e army that Philip’s son, Alexander the Great (r.
336–323 b.c.e.), led against Persia in the spring of 334 b.c.e.
was essentially the force his father had created except for a
substantial presence of allied Greek contingents. It probably
diff ered only in having a higher proportion of cavalry, since
the main Persian strength was concentrated in that arm. One
innovation Alexander may have made was the creation of an
elite infantry guard, the hypaspists of 3,000 men who were
armed in the same manner as other heavy infantry and un-
der the direct command of the king. Attrition, distance, and
Alexander’s own vision led to an attempt to incorporate Ori-
ental troops into his army. Oriental cavalry were added to the
army as Alexander advanced eastward, but they were kept
separate from Macedonian troops. Orientals were denied po-
sitions of command except in special circumstances.
Alexander’s conquests of the Persian Empire and north-
western India created the initial conditions for a massive move-
ment of population from Greece and Macedonia to the Near
East. Th is movement, over by about 250 b.c.e., led to the spread
of Greek culture and the extensive urbanization in the Near
East. Th e kingdoms of Alexander’s successors were controlled
by Greeks and adopted Greek political practices. Th e military
forces continued and completed a military revolution. Th e use
of professional soldiers culminated in the professional stand-
ing armies of the Ptolemies and the Seleucids. Militia-based
armies continued to exist on mainland Greece and in Mace-
donia, but even there professional soldiers were employed on a
substantial scale. Th ese were much more heterogeneous armies
than those of the Classical Period (480–323 b.c.e.), consisting
of Greeks, Macedonians, and mercenaries drawn from all over
the Mediterranean as well as levies of subject peoples. War and
conquest had created Greek states on a far vaster scale than
earlier. Despite these advantages, none of the monarchies cre-
ated in the wake of Alexander’s death was capable of resisting
the advance of a Roman army based on the militia system.
Alexander’s death in 323 b.c.e. led to a half century of
struggle, which ended in the establishment of three large
successor kingdoms: the Ptolemaic based in Egypt, the Se-
leucid, whose territory stretched from the seacoast of Asia
Minor to northwestern India at its greatest extent, and the1148 war and conquest: Greece0895-1194_Soc&Culturev4(s-z).i1148 1148 10/10/07 2:31:15 PM