from outside their borders. Th e Sassanian state (224–651 c.e.)
in Persia is typical. When Shapur II led his expedition into
Mesopotamia in 359 c.e., his army included Armenians, Ar-
abs, Albani, Chionitai, Gelani, Segestani, and others. Some of
the armed forces consisted of slaves. Th ere is also a tradition
of slave-soldiers in the Arabian peninsula, with such soldiers
regularly serving in the armies of the Near East.
Still, actual fi ghting typically turned on individual set
battles. Despite the large size of their empire, the Sassanians
fi elded small combat units. Th e small operational units and
the need to deal with armed threats in geographically lim-
ited zones of confrontations resulted in strategies and plans
that were oft en ad hoc decisions made either by the com-
mander in the fi eld or, given the political dangers of such
autonomy, aft er consultation with the king. Th e close con-
nection between war and political power put constant pres-
sure on rulers to direct war in person on the fi eld of battle
and to prove their worth as monarchs by showing success
in war.
Much of the success of a leader rested on the fi ghting
ability of the men under his command. Battle madness of
elite warriors is known from the myths of many Near East
nations. Berserk warriors, mad for fi ghting, scorned armor
and were among the most feared soldiers. Chiefl y swordsmen,
they were fi rst identifi ed as fi ghting in the army of Tukulti-
Ninurta, king of Assyria when he defeated the Babylonians in
1228 b.c.e. Tukulti-Ninurta’s berserks had armor but threw it
off along with their garments in sight of the enemy. Th e eff ect
on the Babylonians undoubtedly contributed to the victory of
the Assyrians.
Fortifi cations also led to specifi c types of combat, no-
tably the siege. Siege warfare arose when there was a clearly
defi ned frontier between relatively balanced opposing forces
and when large and heavily fortifi ed urban centers were pres-
ent in the frontier zone. Th ese cities were expensive to attack,
limiting the use of siege only to those nations wealthy enough
to fi nance it. When the Roman and Sasanian empires met
each other in the great plain between the upper Tigris and
Euphrates rivers, both sides wanted the wealth stored in the
treasuries of heavily fortifi ed cities controlled by the opposi-
tion. Both the Romans and the Sassanians resorted to sieges
in the fourth century c.e.
Th e confl icts followed a close routine for both the be-
sieged and the besiegers. Usually the attacking forces fi rst
made a tremendous display of power with the hope of fright-
ening the besieged into surrendering. If this tactic failed, it
was usually followed by a parlay in which the besiegers at-
tempted to negotiate the surrender of the city on equitable
terms by a mixture of threats and off ers of security and safe
conduct. If these moves failed, the besiegers then moved to
the next step of simultaneous attacks directed at the full cir-
cuit of the city’s walls. Th e attackers looked for a weak spot or
to induce surrender by demonstrating the seriousness of the
besieger’s intentions. If this tactic failed, the attackers fi nally
brought in heavy siege equipment and began large-scale min-
ing operations. Th roughout this sequence, activity stopped at
darkness and resumed at daybreak.
As did the availability of light, weather dictated military
tactics. In winter armies retreated from war only to advance
when spring returned. Sometimes these responses to natural
conditions were translated into traditional cultural prohibi-
tions, such as the time around the spring equinox when Sara-
cens entered a two-month-long sacred period during which
they refused to undertake raids against their enemies. Th e
history of warfare in the Near East is one of extreme stability.Few battles in Mesopotamia and the Near East were
won without the assistance of horses, yet while kings
and men are celebrated, horses receive little credit
for their military contributions. Domesticated horses
were initially believed to be natives of the Zagros
Mountains in present-day Iran that spread through-
out the Near East while pulling chariots. The currently
accepted thinking favors a gradual spread of horse
from the Russian steppe, so that the inhabitants of
Mesopotamia were familiar with these equines from
the third millennium B.C.E. onward.
The horse did not immediately replace the mule
or the ass, the common beasts of burden in the an-
cient Near East. Adoption was slow because of the
qualities of the animal. Of all domesticated animals,
the horse remains the most temperamental and ner-
vous. An animal of fl ight rather than fi ght, the fi rst
reaction of a horse to danger is to gallop to a safer
place. This tendency presents a problem in battle or
when hauling men and materials to a battlefi eld.
Horses also proved more diffi cult to train, partly
because more is expected from them. Horses pulled
wagons, carts, and chariots while holding bone and
metal devices in their mouths and tolerating a num-
ber of straps and weights on their heads and bodies.
When four horses were used for a chariot or wagon,
only the two closest horses were yoked, with the two
outsiders controlled by reins alone. As herd animals,
horses were easier to manage in teams than alone.
They were also competitive at speed. The outside
horses, feeling less pressure against their throats and
less yoke pressure on their necks than the inner ani-
mals, would have set the pace for the whole team.
During the journey the inner horses would periodi-
cally exchange places with those on the outside. The
ease of training horses to work together explains the
initial popularity of chariots over cavalry. Ridden
horses did not become a regular feature of armies in
the Near East until the fi rst millennium B.C.E.THE HORSE
Military: The Middle East 729