at their own expense, and this restricted military service to
those who possessed a minimum amount of property.
Th e nucleus of this army was a heavy infantry made up
of soldiers called hoplites, who were well protected by ar-
mor consisting of a bronze helmet, a cuirass that covered the
body from waist to neck, and a set of greaves for the shins. A
hoplite’s main off ensive weapon was a heavy thrusting spear.
Th is was used in a rectangular phalanx formation in which
the soldiers fi ghting close together mutually reinforced one
another, protecting one another with their large circular
shields. Th eir attacks were launched frontally against other
armies that were armed and deployed in the same fashion.
Th e key to victory was to break apart the enemy phalanx.
Th ese engagements tended to be sharp and short, and, since
there was little in the way of well-thought-out logistics, most
campaigns were undertaken either to defend against a neigh-
boring state or to take control of some nearby territory.
Th ere appears to have been no organized cavalry force
until the middle of the fi ft h century b.c.e. Aft er that time the
cavalry was drawn from those wealthier citizens who could
aff ord to maintain horses. Th e poorer citizens served as light-
armed troops who used missile weapons, especially javelins.
Th ese troops were used to open the battle and to cover the
movements of the hoplites, who, as the heavy infantry, were
the decisive force. In areas of Greece that did not form city-
states, older styles of open fi ghting continued.
Outside Sparta there is little evidence for training meth-
ods before the end of the fourth century. Th ere must have
been some instruction in marching in formation, but it seems
that training in the use of weapons was left to the individual.
Th e Spartans were an exception to this part-time soldiering.
All full male citizens were trained and served as full-time
soldiers. A rigorous course of physical hardening lasted from
the age of six to 18 in groups that segregated the boys from
normal family life. Weapons training and marching train-
ing were included and repeated when on campaign. In some
other city-states there were special formations of hoplites that
seem to have received special training, but Sparta remained
unique in fi elding a professional army. Th at advantage al-
lowed it to become the preeminent land power and to create
a military alliance in the Peloponnese that further strength-
ened its dominance.
Greeks serving as mercenaries are known as early as the
seventh century b.c.e. For the most part that service was per-
formed in the Near East. Th ere are occasional references to
small groups of mercenaries serving in the homeland, but it is
not until the Peloponnesian War (431–404 b.c.e.), fought be-
tween Athens and the Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta),
that there is evidence for large numbers. Mercenaries were
predominantly drawn from the poor regions of Greece, such
as Arcadia and Achaea; specialist troops, especially from
Th race, were also used. Th e fourth century saw a rise in the
demand for mercenaries as a result of the increased use of
light-armed troops whose style of fi ghting required long
training to be eff ective. In the Hellenistic Period (323–31
b.c.e.) the armies of all the major Greek kingdoms except for
Macedonia consisted of mercenaries who served for life, and
attempts were made to retain their loyalty by granting them
areas for settlement and right to land.
Before the Peloponnesian War the tactics of hoplite battle
had been relatively simple. Dense arrays of soldiers in rectan-
gular phalanx formation each attempted to break the order of
the opposing phalanx to achieve victory. Th e simple nature
of such encounters was marked by the absence of reserves—
since massing men added to the impact of the charge—and by
the participation in the fi ghting of the commander who, once
he arrayed his men, had nothing do to but serve as an example
to them. But by the last phase of the Peloponnesian War more
complicated tactics had been developed by the Spartans. Th ey
attempted to use their right wing to encircle the enemy’s left
and to roll up their phalanx.
By the 370s the Th ebans had developed a tactic to counter
the Spartan outfl anking maneuver by massing their left wing
very deeply, up to 50 men in contrast to the normal depth of
eight. Th ese changes in tactics were accompanied by the fi rst
use of reserves. Th e Peloponnesian War also saw a further
development in the use of combined arms, a strategy that was
to develop extensively in the fourth century in smaller en-
counters. Normally a phalanx of hoplites was used to hold
the enemy heavy infantry while it was worn down by repeated
attacks of light-armed troops and cavalry. Th e eff ective use of
combined arms in set-piece battles came with the Macedo-
nians and Alexander the Great. Alexander used the oblique
advance fi rst developed by the Th ebans to thin the enemy line
and, while holding it with his phalanx, delivered the crucial
blow on a weak point with his cavalry. In the period aft er Al-
exander there was a shift back to the heavy infantry as the
decisive arm, given the expense of maintaining cavalry.
Hoplite armies were poorly adapted for siege warfare,
and so city fortifi cation remained relatively simple through
the fourth century b.c.e. with some exceptions. Oft en theTh e fortifi cations of Eleutherae, a city in the northern part of Attica,
bordering the country of Boeotia (Alison Frantz Photographic Collection,
American School of Classical Studies at Athens)
Military: Greece 733