Diplomatic observers noted that the US activity was entirely confined to the high-profile
"glass palace" of the UN, and that virtually nothing was being done by US ambassadors
in capitals around the world. But Bush countered that if it were just a question of going
through the motions as a gesture for Taiwan, he would not be devoting so much of his
time and energy to the cause. The main effort was at the UN because "this is what the UN
is for," he commented. Bush said that his optimism about keeping the Taiwan
membership had increased over the past three weeks. [fn 12]
By late September, Bush was saying that he saw a better than 50-50 chance that the UN
General Assembly would seat both Chinese governments. By this time, the official US
position as enunciated by Bush was that the Security Council seat should go to Peking,
but that Taipei ought to be allowed to remain in the General Assembly. Since 1961, the
US strategy for blocking the admission of Peking had depended on a procedural defense,
obtaining a simple majority of the General Assembly for a resolution defining the seating
of Peking as an Important Question, which required a two-thirds majority in order to be
implemented. Thus, if the US could get a simple majority on the procedural vote, one
third plus one would suffice to defeat Peking on the second vote.
The General Assembly convened on September 21. Bush and his aides were running a
ludicrous all-court press on scores of delegations. Twice a day there was a State
Department briefing on the vote tally. "Yes, Burundi is with us...About Argentina we're
not sure," etc.) All this attention got Bush an appearance on "Face the Nation", where he
said that the two-China policy should be approved regardless of the fact that both Peking
and Taipei rejected it. "I don't think we have to go through the agony of whether the
Republic of China will accept or whether Peking will accept," Bush told the interviewers.
"Let the United Nations for a change do something tha really does face up to reality and
then let that decision be made by the parties involved," said Bush with his usual
inimitable rhetorical flair.
The UN debate on the China seat was scheduled to open on October 18; on October 12
Nixon gave a press conference in which he totally ignored the subject, and made no
appeal for support for Taiwan. On October 16, Kissinger departed with great fanfare for
China. Kissinger says in his memoirs that he had been encouraged to go to China by
Bush, who assured him that a highly publicized Kissinger trip to Peking would have no
impact whatever on the UN vote. On October 25, the General Assembly defeated the US
resolution to make the China seat an Important Question by a vote of 59 to 54, with 15
abstentions. Ninety minutes later came the vote on the Albanian resolution to seat Peking
and expel Taipei, which passed by a vote of 76 to 35. Bush then cast the US vote to seat
Peking, and then hurried to escort the ROC delegate, Liu Chieh, out of the hall for the last
time. The General Assembly was the scene of a jubilant demonstration led by third world
delegates over the fact that Red China had been admitted, and even more so that the US
had been defeated. The Tanzanian delegate danced a jig in the aisle. Henry Kissinger,
flying back from Peking, got the news on his teletype and praised Bush's "valiant efforts."
Having connived in selling Taiwan down the river, it was now an easy matter for the
Nixon regime to fake a great deal of indignation for domestic political consumption about