Bush was on the edge of having his entire Watergate past come out in the wash, but the
liberal Democrats were already far too devoted to the one-party state to grill Bush
seriously. In a few seconds, responding to another question from Hart, Bush was off the
hook, droning on about plausible deniability, of all things:"...and though I understand the
need for plausible deniability, I think it is extremely difficult."
In his next go-round, Hart asked Bush about the impact of the cuthroat atmosphere of the
Cold War and its impact on American values. Bush responded: "I am not going to sit here
and say we need to match ruthlessness with ruthlessness. I do feel we need a covert
capability and I hope that it can minimize these problems that offend our Americans. We
are living in a very complicated, difficult world." This note of support for covert
operations would come up again and again. Indicative of Bush's thinking was his
response to a query from Hart about whether he would support a US version of the
British Official Secrets Act, which defines as a state secret any official information which
has not been formally released to the public, with stiff criminal penalties for those who
divulge or print it. In the era of FOIA, Bush did not hesitate: "Well, I understand that was
one of the recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission. Certainly I would give it
some serious attention." Which reeks of totalitarianism.
The next day, December 16, 1975, Church, appearing as a witness, delivered his phillipic
against Bush. After citing evidence of widespread public concern about the renewed
intrusion of the CIA in domestic politics under Bush, Church reviewed the situation:
So here we stand. Need we find or look to higher places than the Presidency and the nominee
himself to confirm the fact that this door [of the Vice Presidency in 1976] is left open and that he
remains under active consideration for the ticket in 1976? We stand in this position in the close
wake of Watergate, and this committee has before it a candidate for Director of the CIA, a man of
strong partisan political background and a beckoning political future. Under these cirumstances I
find the appointment astonishing. Now, as never before, the Director of the CIA must be
completely above political suspicion. At the very least this committee, I believe, should insist that
the nominee disavow any place on the 1976 Presidential ticket. [...] I believe that this committee
should insist that the nominee disavow any place on the 1976 Presidential ticket. Otherwise his
position as CIA Director would be hoplessly compromised. [...] Mr. Chairman, let us not make a
travesty out of our efforts to reform the CIA. The Senate and the people we represent have the
right to insist upon a Central Intelligence Agency which is politically neutral and totally
professional. It is strange that I should have to come before this of all committees to make that
argument.[...]If Ambassador Bush wants to be Director of the CIA, he should seek that position. If he wants to
be Vice President, then that ought to be his goal. It is wrong for him to want both positions, even
in a Bicentennial year.It was an argument that conceded far too much to Bush in the effort to be fair. Bush was
incompetent for the post, and the argument should have ended there. Church's
unwillingness to demand the unqualified rejection of such a nominee no matter what
future goodies he was willing temporarily to renounce has cast long shadows over
subsequent American history. But even so, Bush was in trouble. The other senators
questioned Church. Thurmond was a bullying partisan for Bush, demanding that Church
certify George for the GOP ticket in 1976, which Church was unwisely willing to do.