To be very candid about it, it seems to me that the President has put you in a very awkward
position. The need here is really to save the CIA. I do not need to recite what the Agency has gone
through. It has been a very rough period. And it seems to me that the judgment of the President in
this matter is at best imposing a terrible burden on the CIA and on you. It raises a problem here of
nominating someone, who is a potential candidate, for service of less than a year. This is what
really troubles me because I have the highest regard and personal respect for your ability and
above all, your integrity. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the President should assure this
committee that he will not ask Ambassador Bush to be on the ticket.Jackson, a former chairman of the Democratic national Committee, had turned down an
offer from Nixon to be Secretary of Defense, and had cited his party post as a reason for
declining. While George squirmed, Jackson kept repeating his litany that "Ambassador
Bush is in an awkward position." Bush asked for the opportunity to reply, saying that he
would make it "brief and strong." He began citing James Schlesinger serving a few
months at the CIA before going on to the Pentagon, a lamentable comparison all around.
With Bush red-faced and whining, knowing that the day was going very badly indeed,
Stennis tried to put him out of his misery by ending the session. But even this was not
vouchsafed to poor, tormented George. He still had to endure Senator Leahy explaining
why he, too, would vote against the Bush nomination.
Bush whined in reply "Senator, I know you have arrived at your conclusion honestly and
I would only say I think it is unfortunate that you can say I have the character and I have
the integrity, the perception, but that the way it is looked at by somebody else overrides
that." A candidate for the CIA was in mortal peril, but a public wimp was born.
Bush had been savaged in the hearings, and his nomination was now in grave danger of
being rejected by the committee, and then by the full Senate. Later in the afternoon of
November 16, a damage control party met at the White House to assess the situation for
Ford. [fn 18] According to Patrick O'Donnell of Ford's Congressional Relations Office,
the most Bush could hope for was a bare majority of 9 out of 16 votes on the Stennis
committee. This represented the committee Republicans, plus Stennis, Harry Byrd of
Virginia, and Stuart Symington. But that was paper thin, thought O'Donnell: "This gives
is a bare majority and will, of course, lead to an active floor fight which will bring the
rank and file Democrats together in a vote which will embarrass the President and badly
tarnish, if not destroy, one of his brightest stars." O'Donnell was much concerned that
Jackson had "called for the President to pulicly remove George Bush from the vice
presidential race." Senator Cannon had not attended the hearings, and was hard to judge.
Senator McIntyre obviously had serious reservations, and Culver, Leahy, and Gary Hart
were all sure to vote no. A possible additional Democratic vote for Bush was that of Sam
Nunn of Georgia, whom O'Donnell described as "also very hesitant but strongly respects
George and has stated that a favorable vote would only be because of the personal
relationship." O'Donnell urge Ford to call both Cannon and Nunn.
LBJ had observed that Ford was so dull that he was incapable of walking and chewing
gum at the same time. But now even Ford knew he was facing the shipwreck of one of
his most politically sensitive nominations, important in his efforts to dissociate himself
from the intelligence community mayhem of the recent past.