With that, the Congress was terrorized and brought to heel. In this atmosphere, Bush
moved to reach a secret foreign policy consensus with key Congressional leaders of both
parties of the one-party state. According to two senior government officials involved,
limited covert operations in such places as Angola were continued under the pretext that
they were necessary for phasing out the earlier, larger, and more expensive operations.
Bush's secret deal was especially successful with the post-Church Senate Intelligence
Committee. Because of the climate of restoration that prevailed, a number of Democrats
on this committee concluded that they must break off their aggressive inquiries ("the
adversary thing") and make peace with Bush, according to reports of remarks by two
senior members of the committee staff. The result was an interregnum during which the
Senate committee would neither set specific reporting requirements, nor attempt to pass
any binding legislation to restrict CIA covert and related activity. In return, Bush would
pretend to make a few disclosures to create a veneer of cooperation. [fn 39] These 1976
deals set the stage for many of the foreign intelligence monstrosities of the Jimmy Carter
era. Ever since, the pretense of Congressional oversight over the intelligence community
has been a mockery.
One theatre of covert operations in which Bush became involved was Angola. Here a
civil war had erupted in 1974 with the end of Portuguese colonial rule, pitting the US-
backed UNITA of Jonas Savimbi and the FNLA of Holden Roberto against the Marxist
MPLA. In December, 1975 the Senate passed the Clark Amendment, designed to cut off
US funding for the military factions. The Clark Amendment passed the House, and a ban
on CIA operations in Angola became law on February 9, 1976. The chief of the CIA
Angola task force, John Stockwell, later wrote that after February 9, the CIA kept
sending planeloads of weapons from Zaire to UNITA forces in Angola, despite the fact
that this was now illegal. There were at least 22 of such flights. Also in February, the
Bush CIA began making large cash payoffs "to anyone who had been associated with our
side of the Angolan war." This meant that President Mobutu of Zaire got $2 million
which he was supposed to give to pro-western guerilla factions; Mobutu simply kept the
money, and the CIA's guerillas "were left starving," said Stockwell. The Congress found
out about Bush's illegal largesse, and subjected him to a series of hostile committe
hearings in which full disclosure was demanded. The House Appropriations Committee
placed a team of auditors in CIA headquarters to review accounting on the Angola
program, which was code named IAFEATURE. On March 12 Bush sent a cable to all
CIA stations ordering that no funds be spent on IAFEATURE. One day later, an
uninsured cargo plane was shot down inside Angola. Despite this ignominious
conclusion, Bush ordered awards and commendations for the 100 CIA personnel who had
worked on the program. [ fn 40]
During Bush's first months in Langley, the CIA under orders from Henry Kissinger
launched a campaign of destabilization of Jamaica for the purpose of preventing the re-
election of Prime Minister Michael Manley. This included a large-scale campaign to
foment violence during the election, and large amounts of illegal arms were shipped into
the island. $10 million was spent on the attempt to overthrow Manley, and at least three
assassination attempts took place with the connivance of the CIA. [fn 41]