George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography

(Ann) #1

piped up in oblique reference to the Trilateral membership of some candidates, including
Bush: "all these people come out of an international economic industrial organization
with a pattern of thinking on world affairs" that led to a "softening on defense." That
played well, and Reagan decided he would pick up the theme. On February 7, 1980
Reagan observed in a speech that 19 key members of the Carter Administration,
including Carter, were members of the Trilateral Commission. According to Reagan, this
influence had indeed led to a "softening on defense" because of the Trilateraloids' belief
that business "should transcend, perhaps, the national defense." [fn 21] This made sense:
Bush would later help enact NAFTA and GATT. Voters whose fathers remembered the
complaint of a beaten Bonesman, Robert Taft, in 1952-- that every GOP presidential
candidate since 1936 had been chosen by Chase bank and the Rockefellers-- found this
touched a responsive chord.


Bush realized that he was faced with an ugly problem. He summarily resigned from both
the Traileral Commission and from the New York Council on Foreign Relations. But his
situation in New Hampshire was desperate. His cover had been largely blown. He
stopped talking about the "Big Mo" and began babbling that he was "the issues
candidate." This was an error in demagogy, also because Bush had nothing to say. When
he tried to grapple with issues, he immediately came under fire from the press.
Newsweek now found his solutions "vague." The Washington Post reported that Bush
"has been ill-prepared to respond to simple questions about basic issues as they arise.
When he was asked about President Carter's new budget this week, his replies were
vague and contradictory." The Wall Street Journal agreed that Bush's positions were
"short on detail. In economics his spending and tax priorities remain fuzzy. In foreign
policy, he hasn't made it at all clear how he envisions using American military power to
advance economic and political interests."


These were the press organs that had mounted the hype for Bush a few weeks before.
Now the real polls, the ones that are generally not published, showed Bush collapsing,
and even media that would normally have been rabidly pro-Bush were obliged to distance
themselves from him in order to defend their own "credibility," meaning their future
ability to ply the citizens with lies and disorientation. Part of Reagan's support reflected a
desire by voters to stick it to the media.


Bush was now running scared, sufficiently so as to entertain the prospect of a debate
among candidates. One was held in Manchester, where Bush tried to bait Reagan about
an ethnic joke the latter had told. "I was stiffed," explained Reagan, and went into his
avuncular act while Bush squirmed.


John Sears of the Reagan campaign signalled to the Nashua Telegraph, a paper published
in southern New Hampshire, that Reagan would accept a one-on-one debate with Bush.
James Baker was gulled: he welcomed the idea because the debate format would
establish Bush as the main alternative to Reagan. "We thought it was the best thing since
sliced bread," said Baker. Bob Dole complained to the Federal Elections Commission
about being excluded, and the Reagan camp suggested that the debate be payed for out of
campaign funds, half by Reagan and half by Bush. Bush refused to pay, but Reagan

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