Drew Lewis was a leading Bushman submarine in the Reagan camp, telling the candidate
that Bush could help him in electoral college megastates like Pennsylvania and Michigan
where Ted Kennedy had demonstrated that Carter was vulnerable during the primaries.
Lewis badgered Reagan with the prospect that if he waited too long, he would have to
accept a politically neutral running mate in the way that Ford took Dole in 1976, which
might end up costing him the election. According to Lewis, Reagan needed to broaden
his base, and Bush was the most palatable and practical vehicle for doing so.
Much to his credit, Reagan resisted; "he told several staff members and advisers that he
still harbored 'doubts' about Bush, based on Nashua. "If he can't stand up to that kind of
pressure,' Reagan told one intimate, 'how could he stand up to the pressure of being
president?' To another, he said: "I want to be very frank with you. I have strong
reservations about George Bush. I'm concerned about turning the country over to him.'"
As the convention came closer, Reagan continued to be hounded by Bushmen from inside
and outside his own campaign. A few days before the convention it began to dawn on
Reagan that one alternative to the unpalatable Bush might be former President Gerald
Ford, assuming the latter could be convinced to make the run. Two days before Reagan
left for Detroit, according to one of his strategists, Reagan "came to the conclusion that it
would be Bush, but he wasn't all that happy about it." [fn 29] But this was not yet the last
word.
Casey, Meese, and Deaver sounded out Ford, who was reluctant but did not issue a
categorical rejection. Stuart Spencer, Ford's 1976 campaign manager, reported to Reagan
on his contacts with Ford. ''Ron,' Spencer said, 'Ford ain't gonna do it, and you're gonna
pick Bush.' But judging from Reagan's reaction, Spencer recalled later, "There was no
way he was going to pick Bush,'and the reason was simple: Reagan just didn't like the
guy. "It was chemistry,' Spencer said. [fn 30]
Reagan now had to be ground down by an assortment of Eastern Liberal Establishment
perception-mongers and political heavies. Much of the well-known process of negotiation
between Reagan and Ford for the "Dream Ticket" of 1980 was simply a charade to
disorient and demoralize Reagan while eating up the clock until the point was reached
when Reagan would have no choice but to make the classic phone call to Bush. It is
obvious that Reagan offered the Vice Presidency to Ford, and that the latter refused to
accept it outright, but engaged in a process of negotiations ostensibly in order to establish
the conditions under which he might, eventually, accept. [ fn 31] Casey called in Henry
Kissinger and asked him to intercede with Ford. What then developed was a marathon of
haggling in which Ford was represented by Kissinger, Alan Greenspan, Jack Marsh, and
Bob Barrett. Reagan was represented by Casey, Meese, and perception-monger Richard
Wirthlin. Dick Cheney, Ford's former chief of staff and now Bush's pro-genocide
Secretary of Defense, also got into the act.
The strategy of Bush and Casey was to draw out the talks, running out the clock until
Reagan would be forced to pick someone. Inside the negotiations, the Ford camp made
demand after demand. Would Ford have a voice on foreign policy and defense? Would