As the portrait of the old butcher Mao Tse-tung looked down from the former imperial
palace, the students erected a statue of liberty and filled the square with the Ode to Joy
from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. By the end of May it was clear that the Deng regime
was attempting to pull itself together to attempt a convulsive massacre of its political
opposition. At this point, it is likely that a pointed and unequivocal public warning from
the United States government might have avoided the looming bloody crackdown against
the students. Even a warning through secret diplomatic channels might have sufficed.
Bush undertook neither, and he must bear responsibility for this blatant omission.
The non-violent protest of the students was then crushed by the martial law troops of the
hated and discredited communist regime. Untold thousands of students were killed
outright, and thousands more died in the merciless death hunt against political dissidents
which followed. Mankind was horrified. For Bush, however, the main considerations
were that Deng Xiao-ping was part of his own personal network, with whom Bush had
maintained close contact since at least 1975. Bush's devotion to the immoral British
doctrine of "geopolitics" further dictated that unless and until the USSS had totally
collapsed as a military power, the US alliance with China as the second strongest land
power must be maintained at all costs. Additionally, Bush was acutely sensible to the
views on China policy held by his mentor, Henry Kissinger, whose paw-prints were still
to be found all over US relations with Deng. In the wake of Tien An Men, Kissinger
(who had lucrative consulting contracts with the Beijing regime) was exceptionally vocal
in condemning any proposed US countermeasures against Deng. These were the decisive
factors in Bush's reactions to Tien An Men.
In the pre-1911 imperial court of China, the etiquette of the Forbidden City required that
a person approaching the throne of the son of heaven must prostrate himself before that
living deity, touching both hands and the forehead to the floor three times. This is the
celebrated "kow-tow." And it was "kow-tow" which sprang to the lips and pens of
commentators all over the world as they observed Bush's elaborate propitiation of the
Deng regime. Even cynics were astounded that Bush could be so deferential to a regime
that was obviously so hated by its own population that it had to be considered as being on
its last legs; the best estimate was that when octogenarian Deng finally died, the
communist regime would pass from the scene with him.
In a press conference held on June 9, in the immediate wake of the massacre, Bush
astounded even the meretricious White House press corps by his mild and obsequious
tone towards Deng and his cohorts. Bush limited his retaliation to a momentary cutoff of
some military sales. That would be all: "I'm one who lived in China; I understand the
importance of the relationship with the Chinese people and with the government. It is in
the interest of the United States to have good relations..." [fn 17] Would Bush consider
further measures, such as the minor step of temporarily recalling the US Ambassador,
Bush's CIA crony and fellow patrician James Lilly?
Well, some have suggested, for example, to show our forcefulness, that I bring the American
ambassador back. I disagree with that 180 degrees, and we've seen in the last few days a very good
reason to have him there. [...]