BOOK II PART II
mentary pain or pleasure, which determines
the character of any passion, but the general
bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the
end. For this reason, pity or a sympathy with
pain produces love, and that because it inter-
ests us in the fortunes of others, good or bad,
and gives us a secondary sensation correspon-
dent to the primary; in which it has the same in-
fluence with love and benevolence. Since then
this rule holds good in one case, why does it
not prevail throughout, and why does sympa-
thy in uneasiness ever produce any passion be-
side good-will and kindness? Is it becoming a
philosopher to alter his method of reasoning,
and run from one principle to its contrary, ac-
cording to the particular phaenomenon, which
he would explain?
I have mentioned two different causes, from