BOOK II PART III
ceeds not from the other.
To this I reply, that in judging of the ac-
tions of men we must proceed upon the same
maxims, as when we reason concerning exter-
nal objects. When any phaenomena are con-
stantly and invariably conjoined together, they
acquire such a connexion in the imagination,
that it passes from one to the other, without any
doubt or hesitation. But below this there are
many inferior degrees of evidence and proba-
bility, nor does one single contrariety of exper-
iment entirely destroy all our reasoning. The
mind ballances the contrary experiments, and
deducting the inferior from the superior, pro-
ceeds with that degree of assurance or evi-
dence, which remains. Even when these con-
trary experiments are entirely equal, we re-
move not the notion of causes and necessity;