BOOK II PART III
than the actions of wise-men, and consequently
are farther removed from necessity. Our way
of thinking in this particular is, therefore, ab-
solutely inconsistent; but is a natural conse-
quence of these confused ideas and undefined
terms, which we so commonly make use of in
our reasonings, especially on the present sub-
ject.
We must now shew, that as the union betwixt
motives and actions has the same constancy, as
that in any natural operations, so its influence
on the understanding is also the same, in de-
termining us to infer the existence of one from
that of another. If this shall appear, there is no
known circumstance, that enters into the con-
nexion and production of the actions of matter,
that is not to be found in all the operations of
the mind; and consequently we cannot, with-