BOOK II PART III
which has been very unnecessarily interested
in this question. There is no method of reason-
ing more common, and yet none more blame-
able, than in philosophical debates to endeav-
our to refute any hypothesis by a pretext of its
dangerous consequences to religion and moral-
ity. When any opinion leads us into absurdi-
ties, it is certainly false; but it is not certain an
opinion is false, because it is of dangerous con-
sequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely
to be foreborn, as serving nothing to the dis-
covery of truth, but only to make the person
of an antagonist odious. This I observe in gen-
eral, without pretending to draw any advan-
tage from it. I submit myself frankly to an ex-
amination of this kind, and dare venture to af-
firm, that the doctrine of necessity, according
to my explication of it, is not only innocent, but
even advantageous to religion and morality.