BOOK II PART III
but only with regard to material objects.
Nay I shall go farther, and assert, that this
kind of necessity is so essential to religion and
morality, that without it there must ensue an
absolute subversion of both, and that every
other supposition is entirely destructive to all
laws both divine and human. It is indeed cer-
tain, that as all human laws are founded on
rewards and punishments, it is supposed as a
fundamental principle, that these motives have
an influence on the mind, and both produce the
good and prevent the evil actions. We may give
to this influence what name we please; but as it
is usually conjoined with the action, common
sense requires it should be esteemed a cause,
and be booked upon as an instance of that ne-
cessity, which I would establish.
This reasoning is equally solid, when ap-