BOOK II PART III
of being at once present to the sight or feeling.
On the contrary, time or succession, though it
consists likewise of parts, never presents to us
more than one at once; nor is it possible for any
two of them ever to be co-existent. These qual-
ities of the objects have a suitable effect on the
imagination. The parts of extension being sus-
ceptible of an union to the senses, acquire an
union in the fancy; and as the appearance of
one part excludes not another, the transition or
passage of the thought through the contiguous
parts is by that means rendered more smooth
and easy. On the other hand, the incompat-
ibility of the parts of time in their real exis-
tence separates them in the imagination, and
makes it more difficult for that faculty to trace
any long succession or series of events. Ev-
ery part must appear single and alone, nor can
regularly have entrance into the fancy without