BOOK II PART III
change is unpleasant to us, and that however
any objects may in themselves be indifferent,
yet their alteration gives uneasiness. As it is
the nature of doubt to cause a variation in the
thought, and transport us suddenly from one
idea to another, it must of consequence be the
occasion of pain. This pain chiefly takes place,
where interest, relation, or the greatness and
novelty of any event interests us in it. It is not
every matter of fact, of which we have a cu-
riosity to be informed; neither are they such
only as we have an interest to know. It is suf-
ficient if the idea strikes on us with such force,
and concerns us so nearly, as to give us an un-
easiness in its instability and inconstancy. A
stranger, when he arrives first at any town, may
be entirely indifferent about knowing the his-
tory and adventures of the inhabitants; but as
he becomes farther acquainted with them, and