BOOK III PART I
It would be tedious to repeat all the argu-
ments, by which I have proved (Book II. Part
III. Sect 3.), that reason is perfectly inert, and
can never either prevent or produce any action
or affection, it will be easy to recollect what has
been said upon that subject. I shall only recall
on this occasion one of these arguments, which
I shall endeavour to render still more conclu-
sive, and more applicable to the present sub-
ject.
Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood.
Truth or falshood consists in an agreement
or disagreement either to the real relations of
ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact.
Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this
agreement or disagreement, is incapable of be-
ing true or false, and can never be an object of
our reason. Now it is evident our passions, vo-