BOOK III PART II
Here then it appears, that a certain and in-
fallible power of enjoyment, without touch or
some other sensible relation, often produces
not property: And I farther observe, that a sen-
sible relation, without any present power, is
sometimes sufficient to give a title to any object.
The sight of a thing is seldom a considerable re-
lation, and is only regarded as such, when the
object is hidden, or very obscure; in which case
we find, that the view alone conveys a prop-
the last degree of weariness, would look upon it as an
injustice for another to rush in before him, and seize his
prey. But the same person advancing to pluck an apple,
that hangs within his reach, has no reason to complain,
if another, more alert, passes him, and takes possession.
What is the reason of this difference, but that immobil-
ity, not being natural to the hare, but the effect of indus-
try, forms in that case a strong relation with the hunter,
which is wanting in the other?