BOOK III PART III
that it produces our sentiment of morals in all
the artificial virtues. From thence we may pre-
sume, that it also gives rise to many of the other
virtues; and that qualities acquire our appro-
bation, because of their tendency to the good
of mankind. This presumption must become a
certainty, when we find that most of those qual-
ities, which we naturally approve of, have ac-
tually that tendency, and render a man a proper
member of society: While the qualities, which
we naturally disapprove of, have a contrary
tendency, and render any intercourse with the
person dangerous or disagreeable. For having
found, that such tendencies have force enough
to produce the strongest sentiment of morals,
we can never reasonably, in these cases, look
for any other cause of approbation or blame; it
being an inviolable maxim in philosophy, that
where any particular cause is sufficient for an