BOOK III PART III
recommend themselves equally to the esteem
of a judicious spectator. The sympathy varies
without a variation in our esteem. Our esteem,
therefore, proceeds not from sympathy.
To this I answer: The approbation of moral
qualities most certainly is not derived from rea-
son, or any comparison of ideas; but proceeds
entirely from a moral taste, and from certain
sentiments of pleasure or disgust, which arise
upon the contemplation and view of particu-
lar qualities or characters. Now it is evident,
that those sentiments, whence-ever they are de-
rived, must vary according to the distance or
contiguity of the objects; nor can I feel the same
lively pleasure from the virtues of a person,
who lived in Greece two thousand years ago,
that I feel from the virtues of a familiar friend
and acquaintance. Yet I do not say, that I es-