BOOK III PART III
sentiments, which no way belong to us, and in
which nothing but sympathy is able to inter-
est us. And this sympathy we sometimes carry
so far, as even to be displeased with a qual-
ity commodious to us, merely because it dis-
pleases others, and makes us disagreeable in
their eyes; though perhaps we never can have
any interest in rendering ourselves agreeable to
them.
There have been many systems of moral-
ity advanced by philosophers in all ages; but
if they are strictly examined, they may be re-
duced to two, which alone merit our atten-
tion. Moral good and evil are certainly dis-
tinguished by our sentiments, not by reason:
But these sentiments may arise either from the
mere species or appearance of characters and
passions, or from reflections on their tendency