BOOK III PART III
SECTIONII. OFGREATNESS OFMIND
It may now be proper to illustrate this gen-
eral system of morals, by applying it to partic-
ular instances of virtue and vice, and shewing
how their merit or demerit arises from the four
sources here explained. We shall begin with
examining the passions of pride and humility,
and shall consider the vice or virtue that lies
in their excesses or just proportion. An exces-
sive pride or overweaning conceit of ourselves
is always esteemed vicious, and is universally
hated; as modesty, or a just sense of our weak-
ness, is esteemed virtuous, and procures the
good-will of every-one. Of the four sources
of moral distinctions, this is to be ascribed to
the third; viz, the immediate agreeableness and
disagreeableness of a quality to others, without
any reflections on the tendency of that quality.