APPENDIX
such as that of reality or existence, which we
join to the simple conception of an object, or it
is merely a peculiar feeling or sentiment. That
it is not a new idea, annexed to the simple con-
ception, may be evinced from these two ar-
guments. First, We have no abstract idea of
existence, distinguishable and separable from
the idea of particular objects. It is impossible,
therefore, that this idea of existence can be an-
nexed to the idea of any object, or form the
difference betwixt a simple conception and be-
lief. Secondly, The mind has the command over
all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and
vary them, as it pleases; so that if belief con-
sisted merely in a new idea, annexed to the
conception, it would be in a man’s power to
believe what he pleased. We may, therefore,
conclude, that belief consists merely in a cer-
tain feeling or sentiment; in something, that