APPENDIX
of the material world. But upon a more strict
review of the section concerning personal iden-
tity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth,
that, I must confess, I neither know how to cor-
rect my former opinions, nor how to render
them consistent. If this be not a good general
reason for scepticism, it is at least a sufficient
one (if I were not already abundantly supplied)
for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty
in all my decisions. I shall propose the argu-
ments on both sides, beginning with those that
induced me to deny the strict and proper iden-
tity and simplicity of a self or thinking being.
When we talk of self or substance, we must
have an idea annexed to these terms, other-
wise they are altogether unintelligible. Every
idea is derived from preceding impressions;
and we have no impression of self or substance,