BOOK I PART III
ing. They are all of them founded on the same
fallacy, and are derived from the same turn of
thought. It is sufficient only to observe, that
when we exclude all causes we really do ex-
clude them, and neither suppose nothing nor
the object itself to be the causes of the existence;
and consequently can draw no argument from
the absurdity of these suppositions to prove the
absurdity of that exclusion. If every thing must
have a cause, it follows, that upon the exclusion
of other causes we must accept of the object it-
self or of nothing as causes. But it is the very
point in question, whether every thing must
have a cause or not; and therefore, according
to all just reasoning, it ought never to be taken
for granted.
They are still more frivolous, who say, that
every effect must have a cause, because it is im-