BOOK I PART III
in every judgment, which we form, we unite
two different ideas; since in that proposition,
God is, or indeed any other, which regards exis-
tence, the idea of existence is no distinct idea,
which we unite with that of the object, and
which is capable of forming a compound idea
by the union. Secondly, as we can thus form
a proposition, which contains only one idea,
so we may exert our reason without employ-
ing more than two ideas, and without hav-
ing recourse to a third to serve as a medium
betwixt them. We infer a cause immediately
from its effect; and this inference is not only
a true species of reasoning, but the strongest
of all others, and more convincing than when
we interpose another idea to connect the two
extremes. What we may in general affirm con-
cerning these three acts of the understanding
is, that taking them in a proper light, they all