BOOK I PART III
which strikes more strongly upon me. When
I give the preference to one set of arguments
above another, I do nothing but decide from
my feeling concerning the superiority of their
influence. Objects have no discoverable con-
nexion together; nor is it from any other prin-
ciple but custom operating upon the imagina-
tion, that we can draw any inference from the
appearance of one to the existence of another.
It will here be worth our observation, that
the past experience, on which all our judg-
ments concerning cause and effect depend,
may operate on our mind in such an insensi-
ble manner as never to be taken notice of, and
may even in some measure be unknown to us.
A person, who stops short in his journey upon
meeting a river in his way, foresees the con-
sequences of his proceeding forward; and his