BOOK I PART III
view expressly to consider any past experience:
Though in other associations of objects, which
are more rare and unusual, it may assist the
custom and transition of ideas by this reflec-
tion. Nay we find in some cases, that the reflec-
tion produces the belief without the custom; or
more properly speaking, that the reflection pro-
duces the custom in an oblique and artificial
manner. I explain myself. It is certain, that
not only in philosophy, but even in common
life, we may attain the knowledge of a particu-
lar cause merely by one experiment, provided
it be made with judgment, and after a careful
removal of all foreign and superfluous circum-
stances. Now as after one experiment of this
kind, the mind, upon the appearance either of
the cause or the effect, can draw an inference
concerning the existence of its correlative; and
as a habit can never be acquired merely by one