BOOK I PART III
where upon the appearance of an impression
we not only feign another object, but likewise
arbitrarily, and of our mere good-will and plea-
sure give it a particular relation to the impres-
sion, this can have but a small effect upon the
mind; nor is there any reason, why, upon the
return of the same impression, we should be
determined to place the same object in the same
relation to it. There is no manner of necessity
for the mind to feign any resembling and con-
tiguous objects; and if it feigns such, there is as
little necessity for it always to confine itself to
the same, without any difference or variation.
And indeed such a fiction is founded on so little
reason, that nothing but pure caprice can deter-
mine the mind to form it; and that principle be-
ing fluctuating and uncertain, it is impossible it
can ever operate with any considerable degree
of force and constancy. The mind forsees and