BOOK I PART III
occasions. Now it is evident, that the inference
of the judgment is here much more lively than
what is usual in our common reasonings, and
that a man has a more vivid conception of the
vast extent of the ocean from the image he re-
ceives by the eye, when he stands on the top of
the high promontory, than merely from hearing
the roaring of the waters. He feels a more sen-
sible pleasure from its magnificence; which is a
proof of a more lively idea: And he confounds
his judgment with sensation, which is another
proof of it. But as the inference is equally cer-
tain and immediate in both cases, this supe-
rior vivacity of our conception in one case can
proceed from nothing but this, that in drawing
an inference from the sight, beside the custom-
ary conjunction, there is also a resemblance be-
twixt the image and the object we infer; which
strengthens the relation, and conveys the vi-