BOOK I PART III
to that of causation; and it is essential to it, to
leave the imagination perfectly indifferent, ei-
ther to consider the existence or non-existence
of that object, which is regarded as contingent.
A cause traces the way to our thought, and in
a manner forces us to survey such certain ob-
jects, in such certain relations. Chance can only
destroy this determination of the thought, and
leave the mind in its native situation of indif-
ference; in which, upon the absence of a cause,
it is instantly re-instated.
Since therefore an entire indifference is es-
sential to chance, no one chance can possibly be
superior to another, otherwise than as it is com-
posed of a superior number of equal chances.
For if we affirm that one chance can, after any
other manner, be superior to another, we must
at the same time affirm, that there is some-